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The people’s critical linguistics: using archival data to investigate responses to linguistic 
informalisation  
 
Abstract: Arguments about the socio-political significance of the informalisation of English 
have been central to the critical study of language in society since the 1980s. This paper 
demonstrates that informalisation was also a key concern of ordinary users of British English 
in the 1980s. Correspondents in the British Mass Observation Project articulated judgements 
of informalisation that were in many ways continuous with those of academic linguists. The 
paper argues that such critical arguments about language were part of a ‘structure of feeling’ 
(Raymond Williams) of late twentieth-century Britain. This suggests a rethinking of ordinary 
language users’ relations to their linguistic experience, not as unthinkingly ‘prescriptivist’, 
nor as merely ‘common-sensical’, but as exhibiting a nuance which academic linguists would 
do well to engage with more fully. The paper makes the case for the use of social-historical 
archives in investigations of metalanguage, as a means by which the social significance of 
language can be better understood.  




In many fields of linguistic research, assumptions are made about the ‘common sense’ 
stances that non-linguists take towards language, and about how those stances differ from 
those of academic linguists. Proponents of critical discourse analysis suggest that language is, 
for most people, actually constitutive of common sense, and that forms of academic linguistic 
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analysis are required to mount a challenge to this influence (e.g. van Dijk 1993a, 2008, 
Fowler 1996, Wodak and Meyer 2009, Fairclough 2013, 2015). Opponents of such 
approaches argue that a critical orientation towards linguistic experience is a fact of everyday 
life, and there is no need for any specifically academic-linguistic input into this (e.g. 
Widdowson 1995, Jones 2007). For many other linguists, language users’ commonsensical 
metalinguistic activity is assumed to focus largely on the preservation of accent and dialect 
standards and is characterised as ‘prescriptivism’ (e.g. Pinker 1994, Burridge 2010).  
Unfortunately, where one stands on the criticality of everyday stances on language has tended 
to be treated as a matter of faith. There is a lack of research that asks whether, to what extent, 
or in what ways ordinary people’s views on language are critical, or to what extent they do 
conform to the prescriptivism that is often ascribed to them. Critical researchers have done 
little to show that their claims make a necessary challenge to common sense, and their 
opponents have done little to show that they do not. Descriptive linguists have certainly 
identified prescriptive comments about language in lay commentary (e.g. Niedzielski and 
Preston 2003), but it is less clear that criticisms of accent and dialect standards do actually 
dominate ordinary people’s thinking about their linguistic experience. Indeed, if the 
opponents of critical approaches are right, and ordinary people are already engaged in 
politically nuanced critique of language use, then this would suggest a very different picture 
of folk stances on language than that embodied in the image of the conservative 
prescriptivist. So, a series of questions arise, worthy of investigation: Do ordinary people 
already critique language or not? If they do, what bits of it? What kinds of political 
significance, if any, do they see in language? How do their metalinguistic stances relate to 
those of researchers in critical linguistics, and to the image of the conservative prescriptivist? 
This paper addresses these questions with reference to a particular period and place; Britain 
in the late 1980s. This was a metalinguistically interesting time in the UK. On the one hand, it 
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was a crucial time in the development of politically progressive ‘critical language awareness’ 
in university departments of English and linguistics. On the other, it was a period of 
intensified linguistic conservatism, especially in Government and the media (Cameron 1995, 
Ch.3). Crucially for this paper, it is a period about which the Mass Observation Project 
(MOP), a social research project run by the University of Sussex, is able to provide useful 
documentation of at least some ordinary British people’s attitudes towards language. This 
data consists of written correspondence from a panel of over 400 people on the subject of 
‘Rules of Conduct’i.  
I will show that there is a great deal of metalinguistic commentary in MOP correspondence 
on Rules of Conduct. In relation to some key phenomena at least, the metalinguistic 
evaluations of MOP correspondents are extraordinarily close to the concerns of critical 
linguists writing around the same time. These concerns have to do with the informalisation of 
English, and specifically to do with ‘synthetic personalisation’ (Fairclough 1989). MOP 
correspondents make metalinguistic comments such as the following: 
(1) Use of first names bugs me. It is part of trendy pseudo egalaterianism.  
R470 (male, 55)ii 
Such comments are focused on terms of address in particular, and on the socially deictic 
properties of those terms of address, i.e. their capacity to index relative social position (Foley 
1997). Correspondents are highly evaluative of changes in terms of address, and they are 
evaluative in ways that, on occasion, explicitly seek to link these changes to wider socio-
political changes. In other words, many correspondents are critical, and, in the MOP 
correspondence at least, they seem to care more about such critical concerns than they do 
about the standards of accent and dialect supposedly cherished by lay prescriptivists.  
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The paper is structured as follows. First, I introduce a concept that captures the ways in which 
socially oriented linguistic frameworks have distinguished between ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ 
metalanguage. I call this the ‘division of metalinguistic labour’. I then outline the nature of 
the Mass Observation data, and my methods. The investigation of this data answers, in turn, 
the questions posed in this introduction: what bits of language do correspondents evaluate? 
what kinds of political significance do they see in those phenomena? and how do their 
evaluations relate to those of critical researchers, and to the image of the conservative 
prescriptivist? I finish by discussing the implications of my findings for critical researchers, 
and for socially oriented linguists more generally. I make use of Raymond Williams’ (1977) 
cultural theory to reconceptualise the relationship between ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ critique in terms 
of ‘structures of feeling’. And I suggest that the naturalistic methods of metalinguistic 
investigation adopted in this research, and in much linguistic anthropology (Woolard and 
Schieffelin 1994, Heller 2003, Gal 2005, Hill 2009), provide crucial insights into the nature 
of everyday linguistic experience, demonstrating the complexity of everyday ideas about 
language.     
 
2. Divisions of metalinguistic labour 
A ‘division of metalinguistic labour’ is a set of claims that a theory makes about the 
differences between how linguists and non-linguists evaluate (or should evaluate) language. 
Different theories of language work with different divisions of metalinguistic labour, and 
they may be more or less explicit about how they see that division as working. To give a very 
prominent example, classical descriptivism says that while ordinary people are often 
evaluative of language – or ‘prescriptive’ – the job of the linguistic researcher is to be 
neutrally ‘descriptive’. These ordinary evaluations are often also assumed to be conservative, 
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oriented towards maintenance of forms associated with the past and, in most cases, towards 
the maintenance of ‘standard’ varieties (Bloomfield 2014, Pinker 1994, Labov 2001, 
Burridge 2010). From this perspective, while linguists should not be evaluative of language 
use itself, they can freely make evaluative judgements of lay metalanguage, which is 
generally dismissed for both its confusion of linguistic and political argument and its 
supposed cultural illiberalism, a dual criticism well-exemplified by Aitchison’s comment on 
the ‘quaint confusion of morals and speech’ apparently exhibited by lay commentary on 
language (Aitchison 1997: 9).iii So descriptivism has something to say about how we should 
act towards language as researchers, and it presents a picture of how ordinary, non-linguist 
people act towards language.  
Probably the defining feature of critical research, in relation to other academic approaches to 
language, is its alternative stance on the division of metalinguistic labour. It says that it is, 
and should be, the job of the academic researcher to evaluate language use. It is often noted 
that much sociolinguistic and discourse analytic research is broadly evaluative in this way 
(e.g. by Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000, Johnstone 2017), but it is in the field of critical 
discourse analysis that the question of what it means to be ‘critical’ is most explicitly 
discussed. Van Dijk tells us that ‘critical discourse analysts (should) take an explicit socio-
political stance … their work is admittedly and ultimately political’ (1993a: 252, see also e.g. 
Billig 2003, Wodak and Meyer 2009). This is critical discourse analysis’s central objective, 
and it is also its most controversial feature. Unsurprisingly, criticisms of critical work on the 
grounds that it is biased, subjective, insufficiently neutral are very well-established (e.g. 
Widdowson 1995, Stubbs 1996, Hammersley 1997).  
Another line of criticism, closely related to critical discourse analysis’s division of 
metalinguistic labour, asks why we need linguistic researchers (or discourse analysts) to be 
doing this ‘critical’ work at all (Widdowson 1995, Jones 2007). Is it not already a feature of 
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day-to-day life that people are critical of language? Do they not manage perfectly well 
without explicit analyses of transitivity, metaphor, turn-taking etc? In this vein, Chomsky, for 
instance, dismisses Orwell’s influential analysis of political euphemism (2004) [1946] (e.g. 
mass murder represented as pacification) on the grounds that ‘any thoughtful person’ can see 
through it using ‘ordinary common sense’ (2010: 73, 80). 
The critical claim, however, is that an expert perspective is necessary, since linguistic 
analysis can contribute insights beyond those of ordinary experience. For Fowler (1996), as 
for Fairclough (1989), part of the function of critical work is precisely that it ‘challenges 
common sense’ (1996: 4). So critical discourse analysis tends to assume, unlike its critics, 
that common sense is not on its side. Further, even where such claims are not explicitly made, 
the assumption of disjuncture between how ordinary people interpret language and how 
critical researchers are able to analyse it is implicitly fundamental to the critical project. For 
instance, the analysis of some use of metaphor, say, as a persuasive technique suggests that 
someone, somewhere is persuaded. This is never the analyst herself, so who is it? Some 
critically-oriented research, in response to such opposition, adopts reader-response and 
experimental methods to test the effects of linguistic choices on readers (e.g. Richardson 
1998, Llewelyn and Harrison 2006, Fuoli and Hart 2018). However, such research tends to 
provide those readers with linguistic material to respond to, rather than investigating, in a 
more naturalistic manner, what kinds of things, if any, already concern them about their 
linguistic experience.  
The critical analysis of language, then, is explicitly political. It welcomes normative 
metalanguage, but largely as the preserve of analysts, and has little to say about its existence 
in the practices of ordinary people. Its division of metalinguistic labour is very different from 
that of classical descriptivism, the mainstream approach in linguistic work for the past half 
century or so. It is also different from that of some of its critics who suppose a fundamentally 
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critical common sense that might be taken to render academic critique redundant. It is this 
dispute that renders the questions posed in the introduction significant. 
 
3. The Mass Observation Data 
This data investigated here consists of comments on language taken from a long-running 
British social research project called the Mass Observation Project. Mass Observation was 
started in the 1930s by the anthropologist Tom Harrisson and a group of others who sought to 
provide a quasi-anthropological description of everyday life in Britain (see Jeffery 1978, 
Highmore 2002). The project shifted emphasis in various ways over the next few decades, 
briefly serving the Ministry of Information during the early years of WWII (McLaine 1971, 
Spencer-Bennett 2019), before being disbanded not long after the war. It was re-established 
in 1981 by researchers at the University of Sussex, in simplified form, as The Mass 
Observation Project. Since 1981, MOP has issued regular directives to correspondents around 
the United Kingdom, asking for their views on topics from General Elections, strikes, and 
royal weddings to being thrifty, personal hygiene, and using the telephone (Mass Observation 
2015). The material that I investigate is taken from responses to a directive issued in June 
1989 which asked correspondents to comment on ‘Rules of Conduct’. The directive is 
reproduced below. 
RULES OF CONDUCT 
Somewhere between ‘morals’ and ‘law’ we are guided by (usually unspoken) rules 
that I’m going to call ‘Rules for Conduct’ a phrase that covers ‘manners’, ‘politeness’, 
‘etiquette’, ‘code’ and a few other terms maybe. Please don’t feel your answers have 
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to be exhaustive – this is a very big topic! As usual we are most interested in your 
own immediate experience – what you and your family and friends do.  
I would like you to describe appropriate behaviour for as many different situations as 
you can think of in your own experience and from your observations of others. 
Describe how you and others do behave and how you think you should behave. What 
about situations where rules are broken – either deliberately or unconsciously? How 
do people react? When and to whom and how do people apologise? 
Mass Observation 1989 
The prompt, which is almost two type-written pages in length, then goes on to list some 
possible topics, including, for example, ‘Appropriate behaviour’, ‘Formal and informal 
rules’, ‘Greeting people’, ‘Class and culture’, ‘The use of first names’, ‘Appropriate 
conversation’, and ‘Personal remarks’.  
At the time of starting this project in the summer of 2016, seventeen responses to this 
directive (of the total 405) had been digitised and made available online (Observing the 80s 
n.d.). These seventeen responses were investigated as a pilot. Correspondents’ comments on 
language were categorised according to their broad topic area.iv As Table 1 shows, comments 
about terms of address were numerically prominent. There were thirty-one distinct mentions 
of terms of address, distributed across thirteen correspondents. Given this prominence, further 
investigations of the pilot data and the collection of data from the wider archive were focused 
on this particular category.  
TABLE 1 HERE 
This approach was expanded to a sample of the full MOP archive, held at The Keep at the 
University of Sussex. Given the practical impossibility of investigating the entire archive, the 
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correspondence of forty-nine correspondents whose names began with A or B were read 
(following Savage 2007). Of these forty-nine, twenty-five made some mention of terms of 
address, and these were photographed in their entirety (160 pages). In total, across the 
seventeen digitised responses and the forty-nine As and Bs from the archive, thirty-eight of 
sixty-six correspondents made some comment on terms of address. It is the work of these 
thirty-eight correspondents that form the core data of this paper.  
It is noted by the designers of MOP that the project’s value is its detailed qualitative 
information rather than in its capacity to poll the nation (Bloome et al 1993). The MOP 
archive does, though, include a small number of demographic details for correspondents, 
including age, gender and rough location. Correspondents’ ethnicity is not indicated. Class 
identity is potentially indicated in a number of ways, but this information is too incomplete 
and too general to say much of interest about the correspondents to the June 1989 Directive. 
More information is available about age. The June 1989 correspondents, like MOP 
correspondents more generally, tend to be somewhat older than the English population at 
largev (ONS 2016). 
As metalinguistic data, the MOP correspondence is clearly affected by the nature of the 
directive. ‘Rules of conduct’ is likely to elicit comments on some phenomena rather than 
others, especially given the list of suggested topics. However, it also has significant 
advantages over more direct means by which the lay stances on language could be 
ascertained (on such methods, see Preston 2011). Unlike focus group or experiment-based 
reader response methods, for instance, it is relatively naturalistic, since none of the 
correspondents are required to respond to linguistic data that they would not ordinarily 
encounter. Further, it remains the case that correspondents have a relatively wide range of 
choice about what they comment on. They very rarely cover anywhere near all of the 
directive’s suggestions and some bring in other topics not listed. I have therefore assumed 
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that correspondents’ choices of topic indicate matters that are of at least some concern, and 
that the data is useful in showing what aspects of linguistic conduct correspondents care 
about in the first place, as well as what they have to say about that conduct.   
 
4. What linguistic phenomena do correspondents evaluate?  
I have indicated above that terms of address were a prominent concern for correspondents. 
More detailed investigation reveals that they were, in all cases, concerned with the socially 
deictic properties of such terms (Foley 1997, Agha 2007a). Social deixis refers to the capacity 
for linguistic forms to index the relative social positioning of people speaking, addressed or 
referred to. Such concern is evident in extracts such as the following: 
(2) I do not tolerate familiarity, first names are not encouraged until I am sure of the 
people or person I am dealing with. 
A1733 (female, 61) i 
(3) The Church I worship in calls our new Pastor ‘Billy’ his Christian name…I think 
Pastor would give him the dignity he is entitled to. 
B36 (female, 75) 
(4) There is no distinction any more between the way a child addresses another child 
or an adult. When I was teaching I might say to a child, 
 “Is mummy meeting you from school today?” 
 “No, Jane is”. 
 “Who’s Jane?” 
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 “Jane is Laura’s mummy.” 
B668 (female, 60) 
Correspondents’ comments construe relations between terms of address – sometimes as types 
(‘first names’, A1733) and sometimes as emblematic tokens (‘Jane’, B668) – and social 
relations. For A1733 (3), first names are implied to be instances of ‘familiarity’, and, for B36, 
first names are at odds with the ‘dignity’ appropriate to the pastor of a church. As is clear 
from these examples, the specific kinds of relationship that are deemed pertinent are broad. 
But in each case what is at stake is a matter of social deixis. 
In itself, this is awareness of the significance of terms of address is unsurprising. Terms of 
address (and reference, Dickey 1997) are precisely the kind of phenomenon typically 
associated with social deixis in linguistic research (e.g. Brown and Gilman 1960, Paulston 
1976, Brown and Levinson 1987, Foley 1997, Agha 2007a). Further, they fulfil Silverstein’s 
(1981) criteria for the kinds of linguistic phenomena that non-linguists are relatively likely to 
be aware of. For instance, they have identifiable referential meanings (unlike, say, stratified 
phonological variables) and they are relatively context-independent (inasmuch as first names 
are taken to be less formal than surnames across a wide range of contexts). Academic 
discussion often points to instances of lay commentary on such terms (Brown and Gilman 
1960, Paulston 1976). In other words, their potential salience is well-established.  
Nonetheless, it was never a given that terms of address, among the many phenomena that 
could be mentioned, would actually be a central concern of so many of these correspondents 
at this point in time. Brown and Gilman, in their classic account of T/V pronouns, write that 




Indeed, it is specifically changes in terms of address that seem to matter to MOP 
correspondents. Relatively hierarchical, formal or distancing choices are seen to belong to the 
historical past and/or are associated with older people, while the converse is true of relatively 
egalitarian, informal or solidarity-oriented choices.  
(5) To me one of the most noticeable changes in rules of conduct in the last twenty 
years or so is the universal use of first names on meeting – it’s a very far cry from 
Mrs Bennett addressing her husband as “Mr Bennett” in “Pride and Prejudice”. 
 B668 (female, 60) 
(6) If at all possible I prefer to be known as Alison and have asked my boss to 
introduce me as such since Mrs anything makes me feel a. about 100 and b. an 
appendage of Mr. whose name I share. 
G226 (female, 47) 
(7) My own behaviour/conduct – is ‘dated’ in that I find it difficult to be ‘informal’ 
with people I see as a higher status (professionally) than myself. Headteachers + even 
Heads of departments. (often younger than myself.) It is ages before I can call them 
by their first names + always tend to introduce myself to them as Miss Burgess (altho’ 
first names are used with other staff). 
B87 (female, 56)  
Largely, then, it is a particular shift in social deixis that concerns correspondents. This shift 
seems to be similar to that which the linguistic literature calls ‘informalisation’, 
‘colloquialisation’, or ‘personalisation’ (Biber and Finegan 1989, Fairclough 1989, Mair 
2006, Farrelly and Seoane 2012). Informalisation is a well-established academic explanation 
of a number of changes in Twentieth Century English, from the decline of the modal verb 
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ought (Leech 2003) to the increasingly ‘spoken’ character of political broadcasts (Pearce 
2005). In his book Twentieth Century English, Mair (2006) dedicates almost the entirety of 
his chapter on changing discourse norms to the phenomenon as it occurs in written English. 
This seems to be a change that MOP correspondents notice, that they understand as 
significant, and, equally importantly, that, in the summer of 1989, they care about.   
 
5. What kinds of political significance do correspondents see in those phenomena?  
A relatively straightforward story that MOP correspondents might be expected to tell about 
the political significance of terms of address would go as follows: terms of address are 
becoming more informal, and that is because society at large is becoming more egalitarian. 
This democratisation story is essentially the one that some linguists tell about the longer term 
informalisation of English (Biber and Finegan 1989, Brown and Gilman 1960). It is, 
however, a well-established critical position to suggest that informalisation is more 
complicated, and more problematic than this (Farrelly and Seoane 2012). A key claim of 
Fairclough’s take on informalisation is that the shift in social deixis is often not accompanied 
by a concomitant shift in other kinds of social relations. Where this happens we have 
‘synthetic personalisation’. Fairclough’s initial articulation of this idea was published in 
1989, when he wrote that it is ‘a compensatory tendency to give the impression of treating 
each of the people “handled” en masse as an individual’ (2015: 89). The concept remains 
highly influential on critical language research to this day, invoked in analyses of such things 
as health communication on social media (Hunt and Koteyko 2015) and the language of 
Donald Trump (Sclafani 2017). The tendency it names was identified in prominent post-war 
critiques of consumer capitalism in the UK (Hoggart 1957, Williams 2005 [1961]) and the 
US (Marcuse 2002 [1964]). It is there too in Brown and Gilman, who write, during 
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Eisenhower’s presidency, that while ‘The very President of the Republic invites us to call 
him “Ike”’, ‘the differences of power are real and are experienced’ (1960: 271). 
Some correspondents do tell a version of the democratisation story. For instance, in (6) 
above, G226 is positive partly on the grounds that the avoidance of titles and surnames is less 
sexist (see Baker 2010). Most correspondents, however, are negative about the change. This 
is evident in the majority of the extracts presented so far, and in the following:  
(8) I do expect formal names to be retained in ‘business’. I phoned the local paper 
recently to speak to a journalist, giving my full name. The person wasn’t available and 
the receptionist said ‘I’ll get her to phone you back, Rosemary’. I found this much too 
informal from a complete stranger and would have expected ‘Mrs. Archer’. 
A1783 (female, 28) 
(9) This is an extension of the “Use of First Names” part of the report. There is a 
tendency for this modern trend to get out of hand, in that we collect a number of 
contacts, in the course of our work, known as “Bill”, “Joe” or “Jane”, and we have no 
clue as to their surnames! One gets “cold selling” phone calls, starting with “Hello! 
This is Angela, of Bloggs Fasteners”. Angela who? You never get told. 
A2055 (female, 61) 
(10) Use of first names: I abhor it. Which Brian? What Brian? And I am only familiar 
with my immediate family. 
B58 (female, 67) 
The kinds of normative concerns motivating correspondents’ negative judgements are 
variably explicit. Many are thoroughly affective in their response, suggesting that they feel 
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constraints on their own linguistic behaviour (11, 12), or that they feel an aversion to that of 
others (13, 14). Such evaluations suggest an experiential and affective force to linguistic 
experience (Ochs 2012): 
 (11) I would have trouble calling my ex teachers by their first names 
 C1191 (female, 34) 
 (12) I don’t easily use the first names of people older than myself even when asked to 
C108 (female, 55) 
(13) I find myself upset by salespersons who drop straight into first names terms … I 
don’t really need to know the name of the junior who has answered the phone and it 
puts my teeth on edge 
 B1426 (male, 54) 
 (14) I also find it annoying when a conversation is peppered with my name 
deliberately. 
B1215 (female, 36) 
Since these correspondents specifically have these reactions to linguistic changes, they might 
be taken as indicative of a kneejerk, conservative prescriptivism. A woman in her 70s, for 
example, begins her response by writing of ‘Rules of Conduct’ in general: ‘First, of all, may I 
say, that on the whole they’re pretty well obsolete in most cases’. She goes on to say that her 
concerns ‘may seem old-fashioned, BUT they were part of everyday behaviour until after the 
war & made life more pleasant’. She offers a list of ‘Personal rules’: 
 (15) Introductions are still nice. 
16 
 
 Invitations are still nice. 
 Polite words are still nice. 
 Apologies for mistakes, still nice. 
 Orderly behaviour is still nice. 
 Good manners are still nice. 
B736 (female, 71) 
She concludes, ‘I blame the loss of respect, the lack of manners, lack of knowing how to 
behave, & too much T.V violence … I can’t see manners & respect for others EVER coming 
back again & its very sad indeed. It was so much better & a happier way to live, for all 
concerned’. There is a clear element of ‘Golden Age’ thinking here (Labov 2001: 6).  
However, such affective reactions are not necessarily distinct from more politically-oriented 
insight or judgement. It would be a mistake to assume that, just because correspondents are 
critical of changes, they necessarily have no other reasons for seeking to conserve elements 
of the past. A number of correspondents do give further reasons. For R470, first names in the 
workplace are indicative of ‘trendy pseudo egalaterianism’. This ‘bugs’ him. But he has more 
to say: 
(16) Use of first names bugs me. It is part of trendy pseudo egalaterianism. A lot of 
the problems of British Industry (what is left of it) is that the monkey is turning the 
handle and not the organ grinder. 
As a recent example. The firm I work for is all on first name terms even to the owner 
(it is a private company). I was talking to the owner about a job we did recently, 232 
packs of timber from Deptford to Wisbech. “Not a good job, we lost £700 on that” he 
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said, “It was costed on 30 cubic metres a load, the buggers were only putting on 27 
claiming that 30 was unsafe”. “When I started this firm drivers did as they were told, 
if they said a load was unsafe we said your a professional make it safe.” Now I am 
well aware, as he must be that this safety argument is spurious. [Discussion of flaws 
in the safety argument.] The truth is that drivers are allowed to do the job as they 
please, because there is absolutely no discipline, largely due I believe to this all pals 
together image of all on first name terms.’ 
R470 (male, 55) 
R470 seems quite comfortable with the idea that to evaluate a use of language (‘use of first 
names’) is also to evaluate a political or cultural orientation. Here this is ‘trendy pseudo 
egalaterianism’, but elsewhere we see ‘our increasingly informal society’ or the question of 
whether to distinguish between children and adults, or whether to give a pastor ‘dignity’. 
Such comments might be seen as a form of ‘explanatory critique’ in Fairclough’s (2015) 
terms, relating the critique of language to broader structural phenomena. However, the details 
of R470’s ‘explanation’ are rather different to that offered by the critical tradition. He dislikes 
the challenge to hierarchy that he takes changes in terms of address to represent. This 
challenge to hierarchy is inimical to the interests of British industry. Much as it might appeal 
to workers’ sense that they have a right to respect in the workplace, it ultimately gives a 
dangerously false impression of who should be making decisions. These comments can be 
compared with those in (17), in which the correspondent complains, in rather more concord 
with critical researchers, that informal terms of address do not alter power relations in the 
workplace.  
(17) Christian/first names straight off – this alters power relations not one iota in 
either F.E or A.E. or anywhere else. 
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No number (female)vi 
Both of these correspondents are critical of informalisation. But they are critical for very 
different – contradictory – reasons. Clearly, engaging in linguistic critique is no guarantee of 
any particular political stance.  
For these two correspondents, this problematic shift in terms of address is something that has 
taken place in the workplace. Others situate it in professional contexts too: 
(18) Just as I don’t find it comfortable to touch a lot whilst holding a conversation, I 
don’t tend to call people by their name very often, or use terms of endearment. It 
grates on me when people insist on body contact because they’ve been to 
assertiveness classes or are trying to follow some psychological trend. I also find it 
annoying when a conversation is peppered with my name deliberately. I don’t know if 
this is an American trait, like saying “have a nice day” regardless of the time or 
situation, but it always reminds me of door-to-door salesman tactics, trying to create a 
warmth & familiarity which doesn’t exist. 
B1215 (female, 36) 
(19) In business, I have noted telephone manners have improved, because bosses 
insist their staff identify themselves so we hear “This is JOE BLOGGS LTD, LIZ 
speaking, may I help you” you could be a customer, placing an order so mannerism’s 
are are of primary importance, however after dealing with a firm over a period, certain 
staff show their true manners. Their attitude changes once you have identified 
yourself, they become complacent, their service like their manners deteriorate, the 
‘OH ITS YOU’ attitude is adopted, you are left hanging on to a silent line – or have 
jingles ringing in your ear, whilst probably a new customer the new treatment. 
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B2109 (male, 69) 
For these correspondents, informalised terms of address seem to be seen as a linguistic 
technology, used in the maintenance of ‘public relations’ (Fairclough 1996, Cameron 2000: 
75-76). Some very clearly see this as a top-down initiative, encouraged by ‘bosses’ or 
‘assertiveness classes’. However, in a striking comment on informalisation outside the 
workplace, B668 writes of the ‘superficial friendliness’ she has experienced at parties.  
(20) At one time the intimacy of a relationship would be measured by the use of the 
first name. But not any more. At a party people are often introduced to each other 
only by their first names. It’s meant to create a sense of friendliness I suppose, but it’s 
a superficial friendliness which means nothing. One may never meet ‘Harry’ or ‘Jane’ 
again or even want to.  
 B668 (female, 60) 
Many correspondents, then, seem to dislike the assumption of solidarity with those whom 
they do not know well, or with whom they have only a professional relationship. They see 
this ‘superficial friendliness’ as an intentionally deployed strategy to temporarily and, at best, 
partially overcome social distance. The political details vary, as does the degree to which 
correspondents articulate the grounds of their judgements, but something very close to a 
critique of ‘synthetic personalisation’ seems to have been prominent for many in late 1980s 
Britain.  
 
6. Critical research, structures of feeling and prescriptivism 
To begin to answer the final question posed at the beginning of this paper (‘How do the MOP 
correspondents’ metalinguistic stances relate to those of researchers in critical linguistics, and 
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to the image of the conservative prescriptivist?’), correspondents seem to notice the kinds of 
things that critical researchers notice, and to evaluate them in roughly similar ways (and in 
politically other ways too). A distinction made by the cultural theorist Raymond Williams is 
useful in making sense of this. Williams (1977) distinguishes between ‘structures of feeling’ 
and ‘official discourses’ (see also Rampton 2006). Structures of feeling are partially 
articulated, deeply evaluative orientations towards the world which are characteristic of 
groups of people in shared circumstances at particular points in time. Structures of feeling 
have to do with ‘meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt’ which, at the time of 
their emergence, may ‘not yet [be] recognized as social but taken to be private, idiosyncratic, 
and even isolating’. They are the personal gripes, inspirations, experiences, etc., which later, 
‘in analysis (but rarely otherwise)’, become recognisable as socially shared orientations 
towards experience (1977: 132). Structures of feeling are not straightforward ‘common 
sense’, since they are held in common only by those in particular social and historical 
situations who share particular experiences. But they are related to what we identify as 
common sense, since they are implicit and un-codified ways of making sense of the world. 
They exist in complex relations to ‘official discourses’, but the latter, in broad terms, 
selectively formalise and reify the former into relatively structured, systematic ‘discourses’, 
‘world-views’ or ‘ideologies’.  
My claim is that if we read the June 1989 Mass Observation correspondence alongside the 
critical linguistic literature on informalisation, we see a relationship between a structure of 
feeling and an official discourse. Critical linguistic research is neither a challenge to common 
sense, nor a straightforward extension of it. It is an articulation of an existing structure of 
feeling.  
Of course, an alternative possibility is a top-down process, whereby the arguments made by 
critical discourse analysts and others ‘trickled down’ into the metalanguage of ordinary 
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people. There is, though, little to support this top-down view in the MOP data. Some of the 
correspondents do refer to figures of academic authority (e.g. Matthew Arnold, Aristotle, 
Jung), but it is difficult to imagine that most of the correspondents have had much contact 
with the critical analysis of language. Interestingly, however, there is at least one 
correspondent who almost certainly did. A1530 is a ‘Language and Communication Skills 
Tutor’ at a YMCA college in London. She is politically left-wing, anti-Nuclear, and feminist. 
She tells us that she is ‘out of kilter with the Thatcherite mentality’ and complains of social 
occasions that are ‘wall-to-wall Tories’.vii She writes about her professional metalinguistic 
expertise, for instance, about the challenges posed by National Curriculum expectations of 
‘oracy’ education – ‘what a task for the teachers, teaching English in its many different 
modes and registers!’ (A1530).  
She has the following to say about her father’s use of the word hen to address her and other 
women: 
(21) Food was prepared in advance (by the hens). This word, hen, was one of the most 
frequently used words in my father’s vocabulary. It was the Scots equivalent of ducks, 
luv, chick, babe, sweetheart etc. I HATED IT. I always regarded it as a gross insult, I 
should imagine because of an intuitive grasp of the power-inequality embodied in its 
single syllable consigning of my sex to the verbal dustbin. … ‘Hen’ … was delivered 
with a chumminess by men and women alike in the days of my youth. In my older 
age, I have come to terms with the expression by doing a lot of hen-centred thinking – 
my daughter and I have sent the whole thing up and at one stage bombarded each 
other with hen cards (post and birthday variety) and hen gifts (tea cosies, baskets, 
dishes small and large). I bought myself a couple of hen egg holders, and I see them 
every day in my home.  
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A1530 (female, 52) 
It is, in part, the ‘chumminess’ of hen which A1530 objects to. She has objected to this since 
she was young, a fact she attributes to ‘an intuitive grasp of the power-inequality embodied’ 
in the word. On the one hand hen is friendly, informal. On the other, it is used by people in 
positions of relative power to those with less power. This, somewhat like the case mentioned 
by B668 (24), is synthetic personalisation in the domestic sphere, and A1530’s capacity to 
recognise this does not depend on her presumably later-acquired metalinguistic expertise. 
Further, the critical practices that she lists – her ironic appropriation of all things hen-related 
– are not taken from any critical linguistic toolbox. It seems unlikely that she has learnt this 
critical strategy as part of her linguistic education, and much more likely that a broadly 
critical orientation (towards over-informalised sexist language at least) has long been part of 
her life.  
In theoretical terms, the claims presented so far pose a challenge to the division of 
metalinguistic labour that underpins critical research. They suggest that the metalinguistic 
claims of critical linguists and those of ordinary people may be more continuous than is 
supposed, that, the criticality of critical linguistics may be firmly rooted in much broader 
structures of feeling. It does not follow from this, however, that we must reject the possibility 
of academic critique and retreat to a neutrally descriptivist division of labour. The MOP data, 
as much as it asks questions of critical research, highlights five important reasons to avoid 
this return to descriptivism. 
First, and most basically, descriptive categories overlap just as much as evaluative ones. 
Niedzielski and Preston write that ‘non-linguists use prescription (at nearly every linguistic 
level) in description’ (2003: 18). But non-linguists also use description in prescription. MOP 
correspondents also use terms like name, word, conversation, and apology, all of which 
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frequently appear in linguistic research. So the existence of overlap between lay and expert 
metalinguistic orientation is no reason, per se, to reject an approach to linguistic research. Or, 
if it is, then it is surely not just critical research that is due a rethink.  
Second, it is true that the MOP data might be seen to lend some support to the descriptivist 
characterisation of lay evaluations of language as conservative. But this does not quite hold 
of all correspondents. Some do welcome change. And, more importantly, the descriptivist 
dismissal of linguistic conservatism suggests that there is nothing to ordinary people’s 
judgements other than their conservatism. This is a useful way of suggesting that there is 
nothing to be argued about, that ordinary people are simply making a category error, and an 
obviously illiberal one at that, when they condemn linguistic change. But, the MOP 
correspondents do not just argue against (non-count) change for its own sake, they argue 
about fairly specific (count) changes. In some cases, they give fairly clear indications of what 
it is about those changes that they object to. Further, as the correspondents present things, 
these are not simply organic changes, but changes that are actively instigated by others, 
sometimes by others in positions of power (‘more and more of the larger concerns seem to be 
giving their employees the same course’, B1426). In other words, the castle is not simply 
‘crumbling’ as Aitchison (1997) suggests; it is being dismantled. 
Third, the MOP data is suggestive of cases where ordinary people might not be talking about 
things that are of concern to critical linguists as much as it indicates areas of overlap. Only 
one correspondent writes about racist language (B1756, whose entire report is on the topic). 
This general lack of concern might be seen as striking, given the fact that racist language was, 
at the time, a matter of some academic concern (e.g. van Dijk 1987, 1993b), and that, not 
many years later, reports on British people’s attitudes towards language on television would 
suggest much greater concern with racist language (Millwood-Hargrave 1998, Synovate 
2010). One explanation for this may lie in the likely over-representation of white people in 
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the MOP data. Or, it may be that objections to racist uses of language are understood as more 
fully political or ethical than the question about ‘Rules of Conduct’ suggests. In any case, at a 
methodological level, seeking to empirically track relations between the critiques proposed 
by critical researchers and the linguistic concerns of ordinary people can only strengthen our 
understanding of the social and political life of language. It allows us to see that the political 
significance of language is neither blindingly obvious to all or something that is clear only 
through expert analysis.  
Fourth, the MOP data suggests that aspects of language identified by critical researchers are, 
in fact, of real normative concern for people other than the researchers themselves. A much 
more worrying discovery for critical research would be to find that no one outside the 
academic world cared about such things. Without at least some resonance in the existing 
concerns of ordinary language users, critical research would have very little chance of 
political success. Its role, then, might best be seen as involving much less in the way of 
challenging ‘common sense’ or in unearthing ostensibly hidden significances of language, 
and much more in the way of dialogic engagement with actually existing concerns about 
language. While we – all of us – might often disagree about the details of that significance 
(much as we disagree about the details of all kinds of political matters), there is significance 
in the more general point that language does matter in political and ethical terms. 
Finally, as noted at the beginning of this paper, descriptivism tends to assume that the most 
significant stance taken by ordinary language users towards their linguistic experience is a 
prescriptive one, concerned with standards of accent and dialect. But the MOP 
correspondence suggests that there were linguistic phenomena that were more acutely 
troubling for at least some people in 1980s Britain. Few had much to say about accents and 
dialects, and those comments that the correspondents did have – such as G226’s observation 
that ‘Best behaviour often involves a change of accent’ – suggest a more nuanced view than 
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accounts of prescriptive conservativism would suggest. As with the lack of attention to racist 
language, this may very well be an artefact of the MOP directive itself, which perhaps many 
correspondents did not interpret as asking about accent and dialect. But, despite the attention 
paid to matters of language standards in the British press in the 1980s (and since), it is at least 
possible that accent and dialect are not as prominent in lay commentary on language as we 
sometimes imagine them to be. Issues of politeness, social deixis, taboo language, and 
conversational etiquette may be equally, or more salient (Table 1). There is more 
investigation to be done here, but, to give this ideas some corroboration, these are also the 
things that studies of parents’ metalinguistic instructions to children tend to highlight, for 
instance in the ‘politeness routines’ identified by Gleason et al (1984; see also Becker 1994, 
De Geer et al 2002). Of course, a lot depends here on what we count as ‘linguistic’ behaviour 
(or indeed ‘metalinguistic’).viii It is arguable that the tendency of many linguists to imagine 
accent and dialect standards as the main focus of lay linguistic evaluation is an outcome of a 
historically narrow conception of what constitutes language itself, phonology and grammar 
being central concerns. Prominent advocates of a hard descriptive-prescriptive division of 
labour also tend to work with such relatively narrow – or ‘extractionist’ (Agha 2007b) – 
conceptions of language (e.g. Bloomfield 2010, Pinker 1994).ix But if we broaden that 
conception of language, as most contemporary sociolinguists and discourse analysts certainly 
have, then it stands to reason that we might broaden our conceptions of non-linguists’ 
metalinguistic concerns too, and attend to the various forms of metalinguistic commentary 
that exist in day-to-day life.  
 
7.  Metalinguistic comments, language ideologies and linguistic norms 
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The broadening of metalinguistic concern that I have mentioned above is, it has to be said, 
well-established in the linguistic anthropological study of language ideologies (e.g. Woolard 
and Schieffelin 1994, Heller 2003, Gal 2005, Hill 2009). Indeed, the methods that I have used 
in investigating ordinary people’s linguistic concerns are close to those adopted in this field, 
where naturalistic documentation of metalinguistic concern is a major research focus, and a 
somewhat different division of metalinguistic labour tends to be assumed. This tradition takes 
a more ethnomethodological orientation towards ordinary language users’ metalinguistic 
stance-taking. Such stances – classically conceived by Garfinkel (1967) as ‘background 
expectancies’ and now often as elements of ‘language ideologies’ (Woolard and Schieffelin 
1994, Blommaert 1999, Kroskrity 2004) – are seen as constitutive of linguistic phenomena, 
rather than as mere after-the-fact commentary. The researcher’s task is therefore to 
investigate these stances in order to understand the normative constitution of linguistic 
behaviour. It is a meta-metalinguistic approach.  
This paper might be seen as a step towards a combination of, on the one hand, the 
ethnomethodological concern with the evaluative stances taken by ordinary language users, 
and, on the other, the critical linguistic emphasis on the normative significance of language 
(Slembrouck 2001, Heller and McIlhenny 2018: 235-237). The language-ideological 
perspective is particularly important in highlighting a point that has perhaps not been clearly 
stated in my discussion so far. Ordinary people’s comments on language are interesting not 
only inasmuch as they overlap or otherwise with those of academic linguists, and not only 
inasmuch as they happen to ‘notice’ linguistic phenomena. They are interesting because they 
are indicative of the more fundamental ‘verbal hygiene’ practices (Cameron 1995) by which 
linguistic norms are brought into being, contested and challenged.  
What is particularly fascinating in the MOP data is the apparent contingency of this 
influence. It is sometimes assumed in classic ethnomethodological work – though generally 
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not in more recent work on language ideologies – that linguistic behaviour is fairly 
straightforwardly shaped by the normative stances that language users take (Garfinkel 1967). 
In conversation analysis, for instance, conversational order is imagined to be the result of ‘a 
persistent and pervasive orientation by the participants to a set of norms and rules’ (Raymond 
and Sidnell 2014: 250), and the investigation of the structure of conversations – and of 
‘repairs’ within them (Schegloff 1992) – is seen as indicative of such orientation. But the 
MOP data highlights the possibility that people take stances towards language that only 
emerge at a distance, or upon reflection, rather than making themselves directly felt during 
the course of interaction itself; or stances that are characterised by uncertainty about, 
ambivalence towards, or alienation from linguistic behaviour. One correspondent, for 
instance, writes: 
(22) I don’t automatically show my feelings [physically?] when I see people although 
sometimes I want to but am too shy to, I feel awkward and embarrassed. And I still 
call my mothers neighbours Mr & Mrs yet my children call them by their first names 
silly isn’t it. 
D156 (female, 37) 
Many of the MOP correspondents quoted above report similar alienation from the behaviour 
of those around them and of themselves. They find it hard to use terms of address in 
particular ways, or they see some use as being typical but undesirable. It is partly for this 
reason that I have made use of the concept of a structure of feeling: MOP correspondents’ 
comments on language suggest a socially shared but also in some sense private orientation 
towards linguistic behaviour, which likely has a complex, thoroughly contingent relationship 
with that behaviour.  
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To look at this from another perspective, we are well used to the idea that the history of 
English can be characterised by periods (or moments) of metalinguistic concern in complex 
relations with first-order linguistic changes. We tell that history with reference to dictionary 
writing, the Inkhorn controversy, nationalist language projects, elocution lessons, and so on. 
Perhaps a small part of that history is a late twentieth-century concern on the part of some in 
positions of power with the formality of their public language, and an attempt to personalise 
and informalise that language. If so, this is a metalinguistic concern which seems to have a 
correlate in a structure of scepticism about such changes, evident in a set of variably 
articulate affective and political responses to public informality felt by ordinary people and 
by academic linguists alike.  
 
8.  Conclusion 
The MOP data suggests that ordinary people may have things to say about language that are 
very similar to the arguments of critical researchers, or at least that this was the case in late 
1980s Britain, when the critique of informalisation seems to have been a structure of feeling. 
That is not to say that linguistic techniques – e.g. corpus linguistics, discourse analysis, the 
development of technical terms like ‘synthetic personalisation’ – cannot tell us more about 
this situation. But it is to say that there may be nothing qualitatively distinct about academic 
interest in it, or critique of it.  
The methodological importance of this is to suggest that sustained attention to relatively 
naturalistic metalanguage, in this case from a social-historical archive, is important for 
critical approaches to language, and for sociolinguistics more generally. It is important so that 
we can see what stances ordinary people take, and therefore avoid falling into lazy 
stereotypes of lay attitudes towards language; these stereotypes may do more to support our 
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own academic self-conceptions of metalinguistic distinction than they do to represent how 
ordinary people think and feel about their linguistic experience. It allows us to engage with 
existing arguments about language as largely continuous with (perhaps at some level as 
forming the basis of) academic ‘critique’. If we wish to engage in properly political argument 
about language, then there is no point in doing so in ignorance of, or isolation from, the 
things that people are already saying about it. And we can identify ostensibly private 
concerns, which may not be articulated during the course of interaction, but which might 
nonetheless play a significant role in the social life of language. For critical discourse 
analysis, the key significance is that the investigation of actually existing metalanguage 
allows us to go beyond the intellectual stalemate between those who see it as our critical duty 
to point out the political significance of language and those whose faith in common sense 
tells them that such academic critique is redundant. More generally, for socially oriented 
linguists, there seems to be little to be gained by drawing any sharp lines between our own 
academic approach to language and that of everyone else (Paveau 2011). As research on 
language ideologies (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994, Heller 2003, Gal 2005, Hill 2009) and 
on verbal hygiene (Cameron 1995) has suggested, metalinguistic commentary – whether 
carried out by academic linguists, correspondents to a social research project, or anyone else, 
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